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amended EPTL sections 5-4.21?4 and 11-3.2(b)' 2 5 to bring them
into conformity with the new law. Section 5-4.2 states that in an
action for wrongful death "the contributory negligence of the decedent shall be a defense, to be pleaded and proved by the defendant,"'126 thus providing an exception to the traditional New York
rule requiring the plaintiff to prove his freedom from contributory
negligence. Section 11-3.2(b) provides the same exception for a
survival action when joined with a wrongful death action. 12 7 The new
amendments limit these exceptions to actions accruing before September 1, 1975,128 the effective date of CPLR article 14-A. 12 9 Any
such actions accruing after that date will be subject to the provisions of article 14-A.
One probable result of the new law will be a decrease in
negligence litigation. Since a negligent defendant will no longer be
able to escape all liability by proving contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff, but may anticipate at most some diminution of
damages, an increased number of settlements should result. More
significant, however, is the greater equity of the new law - an
injured party will no longer be completely barred from recovery
for injuries due only in part to his own negligence.
ARTICLE

78-

PROCEEDING AGAINST BODY OR OFFICER

Civic associationgranted standing to challenge zoning variance.
Recent judicial decisions, on both federal' 30 and state13 ' levels,
evince a trend towards a relaxation of restrictive requirements for
124 Ch. 69, § 2, [1975] N.Y. Laws 94 (McKinney).
125Ch. 69, § 3, [1975] N.Y. Laws 94-95 (McKinney).

126 EPTL 5-4.2 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
127
1d. 11-3.2(b).
128 Id. 5-4.2, 11-3.2(b).
129CPLR 1413.
130Under the early federal test for standing a plaintiff was required to show that a legal
interest or property right of his had been violated or was in danger of being violated.
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). A far more liberal test, however,
was enunciated in 1970 by Justice Douglas in the landmark decision of Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The Court announced a bipartite
test: the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered injury in fact, economic or otherwise, and that his interest is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected ... by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 153. The Court further established
that the "interest, at times, may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as
economic values." Id. at 154, quoting Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608,
616 (2d Cir. 1965).
This two-pronged test was criticized in New Hampshire Bankers Ass'n v. Nelson, 113
N.H. 127, 302 A.2d 810 (1973), wherein the court held that the injury in fact test should
alone be controlling. Id. at 128-29, 302 A.2d at 811. There is some disagreement, however,
as to the precise definition of injury in fact. Compare United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 683-90 (1973) (liberal approach
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standing to contest administrative determinations. 132 In the area of
zoning, however, New York authorities have been reluctant to
deviate from established principles. To find a plaintiff "aggrieved,"
as mandated by the standing tests set forth in various zoning
provisions, 133 New York courts have insisted upon a showing that
the plaintiff would be personally and adversely affected by the
official decision. This has been interpreted as requiring a petitioner
challenging a zoning ordinance or variance to show that he is 3 a4
property owner in the proximate vicinity of the subject premises
and that he would suffer pecuniary damage by the enforcement of
the regulation in question. 135
This cursory manner of disposing of suits dealing with zoning
granting standing) with Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975) (restrictive approach denying
standing). It is conceivable that the Warth Court denied standing to avoid the controversial
substantive issue of racial discrimination. Whether this decision heralds a return to more
restrictive federal standing requirements, therefore, is yet to be resolved.
131See, e.g., Coghill v. Boucher, 511 P.2d 1297 (Alas. 1973) (action by residents and
registered voters seeking to enjoin lieutenant governor from authorizing procedures in
upcoming election); Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 306,
215 N.W.2d 814 (1974) (action by news media agency challenging school board's meeting
policies); New Hampshire Bankers Ass'n v. Nelson, 113 N.H. 127, 302 A.2d 810 (1973)
(action by bankers' association protesting issuance of negotiable orders of withdrawal by
savings banks).
For two New York decisions granting a petitioner standing in an article 78 proceeding
without requiring a showing of personal grievance or personal interest in the outcome, see
Andrews v. Nagourney, 41 App. Div. 2d 778, 342 N.Y.S.2d 79 (2d Dep't) (mene.), aff'd, 32
N.Y.2d 784, 298 N.E.2d 680, 345 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1973), and Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v.
Board of Trustees, 21 App. Div. 2d 693, 250 N.Y.S.2d 523 (2d Dep't 1964) (mem.).
132 Standing to contest administrative actions has been defined as
a judicially developed doctrine which relates primarily to situations in which an
indlividual or a group challenges governmental action on the grounds that it violates
private rights or some constitutional principle.
Hasl, Standing Revisited -The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 12, 13 (1973)
(footnote omitted). The doctrine is far more ambiguous than this definition suggests, however, and has created much confusion in the law. Professor Hasl, noting that "the more the
courts explain the test, the less it can be understood," id. at 40, describes standing as the
"most amorphous concept in the entire domain of public law." Id. at 12.
133

See N.Y.

VILLAGE LAW

§ 7-712(3) (McKinney 1973); N.Y. GEN.

CITY LAW

§§ 38, 82

(McKinney 1968); N.Y. TowN LAw §§ 267(7), 282 (McKinney 1965).
134See, e.g., Manor Woods Ass'n v. Randol, 29 App. Div. 2d 778, 287 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d
Dep't 1968) (mem.) (petitioner association owning no realty lacked standing); Lido Beach
Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 13 App. Div. 2d 1030, 217 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d
Dep't 1961) (mem.) (incorporated property owners association owning no realty not a
"person aggrieved"); Vitolo v. Chave, 63 Misc. 2d 971, 314 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1970) (community civic association owning no realty not a "person aggrieved").
13 Unitarian Universalist Church v. Shorten, 64 Misc. 2d 1027, 316 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup.
CL Nassau County 1970) (movants failed to establish that they would suffer special damages); Blum v. Board of Zoning & Appeals, 8 Misc. 2d 403, 166 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1957) (absent a showing of personal damages residential property owners are
not aggrieved persons); Blumberg v. Hill, 119 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. C. Westchester County
1953) (petitioners without special injury or damage to personal or property rights lacked
standing).
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challenges13 6 was recently criticized by the New York Court of
Appeals in Douglaston Civic Association, Inc. v. Galvin.'3 7 Concerned
with the "glaring inconsistency" between the stringent standing
requirements involved in zoning litigation and the less restrictive
rules on standing in related fields,13 8 and even more with the
"particular need in zoning cases for a broader rule,"' 3 9 the Douglaston Court found that a civic association had standing to challenge
40
the grant of a zoning variance.'
Douglaston involved a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article
78"4 and section 668e-1.0 of the New York City Administrative
Code 4 2 to review the New York City Board of Standards and
Appeals' denial of a rehearing on the grant of a zoning variance.
Despite initial opposition by town residents, both individually and
through the Douglaston Civic Association, the Board had granted a
hardship variance to an estate, awarding it permission to construct
13' 'indeed, some courts, believing that the claimant does not deserve relief on the
merits, deny standing, thereby confusing these separate considerations. See Ayer, Primitive
Law of Standing in Land Use Disputes: Some Notes From a Dark Continent, 55 IOWA L. REv. 344,
350 (1969). The Supreme Court has stated that the correct test of standing is whether the
plaintiff is a "proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue .... Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1969) (footnote omitted). Yet, it has been contended that
consideration of substantive issues is not an improper "way of looking at standing." See

Albert, Standing to ChallengeAdministrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogatefor Claimfor Relief,

83

YALE L.J, 425,
137 36 N.Y.2d

426 (1974).
1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974), aff'g 43 App. Div. 2d 739,
350 NY.S.2d 708 (2d Dep't 1973), rev'g mem. 69 Misc. 2d 686, 330 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. CL
Queens County 1972).
1 36 N.Y.2d at 6, 324 N.E.2d at 320, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 834, citing National Org. for
Women (NOW) v. State Div. of Human Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314 N.E.2d 867, 358
N.Y.S.2d 124 (1974) (NOW permitted to challenge newspaper publisher's maintenance of
separate male and female help-wanted columns) and Glen Cove Municipal Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Glen Cove NAACP, 34 App. Div. 2d 956, 312 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1970)
(mem.) (NAACP allowed to contest allegedly discriminatory criteria for employment in fire
department) and American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 19 Misc. 2d 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959), modified on other grounds, 10 App. Div. 2d 833, 199 N.Y.S.2d
157 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1960) (religious
organization granted standing to challenge discriminatory practices of foreign oil company).
13936 N.Y.2d at 6, 324 N.E.2d at 320, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
0
14
Id. at 7, 324 N.E.2d at 320, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 835. The Court noted that its holding
would apply to the several zoning statutes, see note 133 supra, in which the "aggrieved
person" standing test is contained. Id. at 5 n.2, 324 N.E.2d at 319 n.2, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 833
n.2.
141 CPLR 7801 reads: "Relief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to review,
mandamus or prohibition shall be obtained in a proceeding under this article." Article 78
has been described as "a comprehensive set of provisions regulating judicial review of actions
by State and local officers or agencies." 8 WK&M 7801.02.
142 NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 27, § 668e-1.0 (1970). Subdivision a provides that
"[a]ny person or persons, jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the board upon

appeal or review.. may present ...a petition ...setting forth that such decision is illegal
.... As the Court explained, the Code thus establishes that an aggrieved person may
challenge the board's decision in an article 78 proceeding in the nature of a certiorari. 36
N.Y.2d at 5, 324 N.E.2d at 319, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
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a six-story multiple apartment dwelling in an area zoned for
single-family homes.1 4 3 When the Board refused the Association's
request for a rehearing, 4 4 the individual petitioners joined with
the Association in seeking judicial review of the denial. Special
term rejected the Board's motion to dismiss the petition, 45 but the
Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, 146 raising for the
first time the issue of standing. The second department found, inter
alia, that the civic organization lacked standing to bring the proceeding since it was not a property owner.' 47 Although the Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the action on other
grounds, 148 it ruled that a civic or property owners' association has
49
standing to challenge the grant of a zoning variance.'
The decision of the Court of Appeals was motivated by several
policy considerations. The extension of standing to a neighborhood
association would allow the expense of contesting a zoning change
to be more evenly distributed among property owners, 50 sparing
the individual property owner the burden of having to personally
attack a proposed zoning change.' 5 ' Furthermore, the adoption of
a broader rule on standing would be compatible with the funda52
mental objective of zoning laws, viz, protection of the public.1
Indeed, it would be "ironic," the Court concluded, to "force a court
to reject . . . a challenge [by an association representing] that
53
segment of the public which stands to be most severely affected"'
by a zoning board's determination.
W See 36 N.Y.2d at 4, 324 N.E.2d at 318-19, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
244The Board refused to accept the Association's argument that the discovery of new
evidence warranted a rehearing. See id. at 5, 324 N.E.2d at 319, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 833. See also
note 148 infra.
145 69 Misc. 2d at 686, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
14643 App. Div. 2d at 739, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
147Id. at 739, 350 N.Y.S,2d at 709.
14836 N.Y.2d at 8-9, 324 N.E.2d at 321-22, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 836. A second issue raised
on appeal was whether the delayed discovery of certain evidence constituted "substantial new

evidence," the presence of which would make the Board's refusal to review the case arbitrary
or capricious. Id. According to the facts of the case, the estate had been granted its hardship
variance on the basis of evidence representing its "Cost of Land" as $121,878. In an estate

tax proceeding eight years earlier, however, the estate had valued this same parcel of land at
$35,000. Although this information had been a matter of public record for over three years,
it was not found by the petitioners until after the expiration of the time period within which
they were allowed to protest the variance. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate,
division's dismissal of the petition, holding that the information did not constitute "substantial new evidence" and that the Board's refusal was not arbitrary and capricious. Id.
49Id. at 4, 324 N.E.2d at 318, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
15Id. at 6-7, 324 N.E.2d at 320, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 834-35.
151
Id.
"2Id. at 7, 324 N.E.2d at 320, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
153
Id.
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The Court enumerated certain criteria, orginally set forth by
Justice Hopkins in his concurring opinion in the appellate division,
which it considered relevant to the determination of whether a
particular organization constituted an appropriate representative
body:
(1) the capacity of the organization to assume an adversary position, (2) the size and composition of the organization as reflecting
a position fairly representative of the community or interests
which it seeks to protect and (3) the adverse effect of the decision
sought to be reviewed on the group represented by the organiza54
tion as within the zone of interests sought to be protected.
Finally, the Court of Appeals added that membership in the association should be open to all residents and property owners in the
immediate area.' 5 5 Applying these criteria to the Douglaston Association, the Court concluded that it qualified as an appropriate
representative. The size and composition of the organization, involving over a thousand owners and residents, established both its
capacity to maintain an adversary position and its ability to effectively represent its members. And, the effect of the variance in
5 6
question was clearly within the zone of interests to be protected.1
Although the Court recognized that a grant of standing to a
group lacking proper interest in the issue and financially incapable
of bringing suit would only prove detrimental to those with a
legitimate vested interest, the equivocal language of the enumerated criteria raises doubt as to their effectiveness as guidelines for
courts in the future. Moreover, their application may prove burdensome to the very property owners the Court was purporting to
protect.
The first factor, capacity to assume an adversary position,
154 Id. at 7, 324 N.E.2d at 321, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 835, quoting 43 App. Div. 2d at 740, 350
N.Y.S.2d at 711. It is interesting to note that the Douglaston Court does not use the more
restrictive language generally employed by the New York courts, viz, "aggrieved or injured,"
see cases cited notes 133-35 and accompanying text supra, but incorporates the more liberal
language of Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970), viz, "within the zone of interests to be protected," see note 130 supra.
155 36 N.Y.2d at 7, 324 N.E.2d at 321, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 835, citing ALI, MODEL LAND
DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-307(3) (Proposed Official Draft, Apr. 15, 1975). This fourth factor
concerning participation in the association merely demonstrates the Court's insistence on
nondiscriminatory membership regulations. Manifesting a similar policy, the ALI CODE,
supra, provides:
The Land Development Agency shall issue an order designating a neighborhood
organization as qualified under this Section if it finds that
(e) full participating membership in the neighborhood organization is open at
least to all registered voters within its boundaries.
15636 N.Y.2d at 8, 324 N.E.2d at 321, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
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presumably signifies more than mere legal capacity or the technical
ability to be a plaintiff. Its precise meaning, however, is not explained. Furthermore, the decision seems to equate capacity with
size and composition, 157 which raises the question of why capacity,
on the one hand, and size and composition, on the other, are listed
as two separate factors. Such vague wording may invite investigation into the organization in question, in which case not only the
size and composition, but conceivably the fabric of the entire organization, even, for example, its treasury, could be exposed to in158
quiry.
Interestingly, none of the factors established by the Court
expressly mandate that any member of the association show he has
suffered or will suffer injury in fact. 1 59 In reference to the second
factor, however, the Court did state that the size and composition
of the association "establishes its ability ...to adequately represent
the 'aggrieved' neighborhood members."' 160 The use of the word
"aggrieved," here and in the statement that the "Association is an
'aggrieved person,' ",161 may imply that it is necessary to show
injury in fact. Similarly, the third factor's concern with "the adverse
effect of the decision ...on the group represented"'' 62 may also be
interpreted as requiring injury in fact. Nevertheless, the Court
does not specify whether such injury is an absolute prerequisite for
standing purposes.
While Douglaston appears to be a liberal decision and a significant step towards bringing New York into line with the current
trend, it may well be a source of many problems for those struggling with its interpretation. The practitioner representing a civic
association should take note that Douglaston's imprecise language
may lead the courts to postpone consideration of the merits while
considering peripheral issues regarding the internals of the organization itself. At this time, therefore, insofar as standing in zoning
157 The Court concluded that the Association's "size and composition... establishes its
ability to undertake an adversary position.
...
Id.
15"Justice Hopkins, concurring in the appellate division decision, indicated that such an
investigation might be necessary when he said that "[o]f course, there may be cases where a
civic organization from its size or composition is suspect .... 43 App. Div. 2d at 741, 350
N.Y.S.2d at 711.
159 In NOW v. State Div. of Human Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314 N.E.2d 867, 358
N.Y.S.2d 124 (1974), the Court granted standing even though there was neither a specifically named injured plaintiff nor any injury in fact. But, in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972), having failed to allege that it or its members suffered injury, the plaintiff
association was denied standing.
160 36 N.Y.2d at 8, 324 N.E.2d at 321, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
61
1 Id.
16 2
Id. at 7, 324 N.E.2d at 321, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
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disputes is concerned, New York remains in a transitional stage.
163
Perhaps legislative action would be an appropriate solution.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

DRL 170(5): Family court order of protection held to be a sufficient
predicatefor a nonfault divorce.
Section 170(5) of the Domestic Relations Law1 64 reflects the
recent liberalization of divorce law in New York.16 5 Under this
provision, if a "husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to a
decree orjudgment of separationfor a period of one or more years,' 6 6
either party to the marriage 67 may, regardless of fault,168 procure
163 See id. at n.4, 324 N.E.2d at n.4, 364 N.Y.S.2d at n.4. Professor Sedler urges that the
concept of standing be abandoned completely, as it "is of little real signifiance [sic]." Sedler,
Standing, Justiciability,and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479, 511 (1972).
On the other hand, Professor Jaffe, in several articles, posits that standing should be not of
right but within the discretion of the court. He contends that the developing relaxed
standards for standing cause certain risks and dangers for the administrative process. See
Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633, 638 (1971); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Private Actions, 75 id. 255, 286-87, 302-05 (1961).
164 DRL 170(5) provides that a divorce should be granted if:
The husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to a decree or judgment of
separation for a period of one or more years after the granting of such decree or
judgment, and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff that he or she
has substantially performed all the terms and conditions of such decree or judgment.
165 Prior to the enactment of the Divorce Reform Law iIi 1966, ch. 254, [1966] N.Y.
Laws 833, the only ground for divorce in New York was adultery by the spouse against
whom the action was brought. Frequently, where such a ground did not legitimately exist,
parties seeking to dissolve their marriage would offer perjured testimony to procure a
divorce. See Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32 (1966).
Currently, in New York, there exist six different grounds for a divorce, see DRL 170, two of
which are commonly referred to as no-fault grounds. See Atkins, The Developing Divorce
Reform Law, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 545 (1973); Branstein, No-Fault Divorce, Alimony, and Property
Settlement, id. 241 (1973).
166 DRL 170(5) (emphasis added). The only other requirement of § 170(5) is that the
plaintiff submit satisfactory proof that he or she has substantially complied with all the
conditions of the separation decree or judgment. Id. Courts have been quite liberal in
accepting substantial compliance, often to the extent of affording a plaintiff the opportunity
to remedy any unsatisfactory performance. See, e.g., Vitale v. Vitale, 37 App. Div. 2d 963,
964, 327 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90 (2d Dep't 1971); Rubin v. Rubin, 35 App. Div. 2d 460, 461, 317
N.Y.S.2d 571, 573 (4th Dep't 1971).
1617An early and particularly vexing issue encountered in the application of DRL 170(5)
was whether that section should be available to the party adjudicated guilty when the prior
separation decree was obtained. See, e.g., Church v. Church, 58 Misc. 2d 753, 755, 296
N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968) (divorce action pursuant to § 170(5)
may not be maintained by a guilty spouse); Frishman v. Frishman, 58 Misc. 2d 208, 210, 295
N.Y.S.2d 70, 72 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968) (either guilty or innocent spouse may procure
a divorce under § 170(5)). The principal objection to permitting a divorce in favor of a
"guilty" spouse was that it would deprive the innocent, and often less financially able, spouse
of economic benefits which would otherwise accrue from the marital status, viz, property
rights; inheritance rights; social security, medical, and retirement benefits; etc. See Hendel v.
Hendel, 59 Misc. 2d 770, 300 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. CL N.Y. County 1969), modified, 44 App.
Div. 2d 532, 353 N.Y.S.2d 454 (lst Dep't 1974) (mem.).

